INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s the American feminist agenda was dominated by the importance of passing the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 1 Women's rights advocates demanded enhanced investigation and prosecution of gender violence crimes, and a federal civil right to be free from gender motivated violence. 2 In 1994, following four years of Congressional hearings on VAWA, feminists heralded its passage as a landmark recognition of gender violence as a civil rights issue. 3 Since then, the Office on Violence Against Women has awarded over $4.6 billion in gender violence grants, 4 but the majority of public debate, press coverage, and academic scholarship has focused on VAWA's civil remedy. 5 VAWA's civil remedy provided gender violence victims with a federal cause of action for "crime[s] of violence motivated by gender." 6 Catharine MacKinnon described the civil remedy as a "historic stand and hopeful step toward free and safe lives for women as equal citizens of this nation." (explaining "the VAWA's civil rights remedy was intended to fill 'the gender gap in current civil rights laws,' and to avoid discriminatory state laws and practices"). 3 See Russell, supra note 1, at 328-29. 4 Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on the Passage of the Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, (April 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-ag-549.html. 5 See, e.g., Jarusinsky, supra note 2; Derek W. Kelley (2000) . 8 529 U.S. 598 (2000) . 9 Although the Supreme Court ruled that the federal civil remedy was unconstitutional in Morrison, the rest of VAWA remains intact, providing states with $1.6 billion dollars annually to finance programs addressing violence against women. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Commemorates Fifteen Years of the Vio- 2013] Twelve Years Post Morrison 225 decision as apocalyptic. 10 Yet, in truth, only a handful of gender violence survivors ever attempted to utilize the federal civil remedy, 11 and only an extraordinarily small proportion of survivors are utilizing the state civil remedies available today. 12 The feminist academic and activist community must face the discrepancy between what is available to survivors in theory and what is useful to survivors in fact.
With only two to four percent of rapes resulting in convictions, 13 the criminal justice system's response to rape is an unmitigated disaster. Rape is the violent crime resulting in the fewest criminal complaints, arrests, and prosecutions in the United States. 14 In 2007, the Department of Justice estimated that one million women in the United States are raped each year. 15 The criminal justice regime has proven incapable of deterring or punishing rape or providing justice for millions of rape survivors, and particularly fails to obtain convictions for acquaintance rape, despite extensive reform efforts. 16 The civil system offers a second possible avenue for accomplishing what the government has proven incapable of accomplishing in the criminal realm: a viable deterrent and punishment for rape. At present, however, in lence Against Women Act, (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2009/September/09-ag-953.html ("Every day, VAWA funding makes a difference in how communities across America help victims and hold offenders accountable. For example, subgrantees receiving funding awarded by states through OVW's STOP Violence Against Women Formula Grant Program reported that, in calendar year 2007:
• More than 505,000 victims were served;
• Over 1,201,000 services were provided to victims; and • More than 4,700 individuals were arrested for violations of protection orders.") 10 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 177 ("The VAWA stood for the principle that a woman could not, with impunity, be assaulted anywhere in this nation simply because she is a woman. It put the power to dispute male sovereignty in women's hands. The Morrison majority decided that the union could not permit that and be the same union it was. The ruling thus raised, as no case before it has, the question whether a nation organized to preclude relief for the violation of one half of its people by the other should survive."). 11 See Christopher James Regan, A Whole Lot Of Nothing Going On: The Civil Rights "Remedy" Of The Violence Against Women Act, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 797, 797, 800 (1999) (noting that VAWA is referenced in more journal articles than court cases and that within the first five years it was in force, the civil remedy was used in fewer than forty reported cases); NANCY MEYER-EMERICK, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1994: AN ANALYSIS OF INTENT AND PERCEPTION 5 (2001) . 12 See infra Part II.D. 13 14 See id. 15 Id. Rape statistics are notoriously difficult to pin down. Underreporting and societal stigma contribute to the difficulty of determining accurate estimates. The definition of rape also varies by state jurisdiction. For the purposes of this article I define rape as all nonconsensual sex. 16 In Part I, I explore the necessity, availability, and use of state civil remedies for rape survivors. First, I explore the goals of rape survivors and the dynamics of acquaintance rape. This exploration is foundational to an analysis of what legal avenues are best suited to meeting the goals of acquaintance rape survivors. Second, I briefly review how the criminal justice system fails to provide adequate deterrence or punishment for acquaintance rape. Third, I review the relative advantages of civil remedies for rape survivors, such as monetary damages and increased control over the course of litigation. Fourth, I evaluate, in the wake of Morrison, the state civil remedies available to rape survivors, analyzing their merits and weaknesses.
While sexual assault survivors may choose not to sue for a myriad of reasons, the survivors who wish to sue need to be financially enabled to pursue their claims, and the plaintiffs' bar needs to be financially incentivized to represent them. In the proceeding parts, I analyze the existing frameworks of government subsidization of civil lawsuits, and draw upon these frameworks to propose an enhanced subsidy for civil suits by sexual assault survivors. In Part II, I first review the origin and policy reasons for private attorney general subsidies, and discuss how I argue lawsuits by sexual assault survivors, like other civil rights suits, should be conceptualized as private attorney general actions. I note that while statutory fee-shifting provisions are already in place in the gender violence remedies of several states, unlike traditional civil rights remedies, gender violence remedies are rarely used. Civil rights claims are traditionally against deep-pocketed institutional defendants where the potential financial gain for plaintiffs' counsel is greater than it would be against an individual defendant in a gender violence claim. The potential recovery from an individual defendant is most often too low to incentivize the plaintiffs' bar to take gender violence cases on a contingency fee basis. I conclude that fee-shifting is a sufficient financial incentive for traditional civil rights actions but not for rape claims against individual assailants. Next, I examine two types of government subsidies for civil suits outside the private attorney general context: civil Gideon provisions and government agency enforcement actions. I conclude that while both forms of subsidies have distinct advantages, neither type of subsidy would be ideal to incentivize lawsuits by sexual assault survivors against individual perpetrators. 
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Twelve Years Post Morrison 227 Part III synthesizes the strengths of the three examined types of government subsidies: private attorney general provisions, civil Gideon provisions, and government agency enforcement actions, to construct the proposed survivor recovery subsidy. In this part, I explain the mechanics of my proposal, and its attractiveness to the plaintiffs' bar and to survivors seeking civil recovery. Finally, I address constitutional, practical, and feminist objections to my proposal.
I. A SURVEY OF THE NECESSITY, AVAILABILITY, AND USE OF STATE CIVIL REMEDIES FOR RAPE SURVIVORS

A. Acquaintance Rape Survivors' Goals
A summary of the particular circumstances and goals of acquaintance rape survivors is both central and foundational to an inquiry into the advantages and disadvantages of legal remedies for acquaintance rape survivors. First, we must account for the particular circumstances of acquaintance rape survivors, as distinct from stranger rape survivors. Of course, each rape survivor is different, and his or her goals and needs will vary according to his or her particular background and circumstances. 20 However, the need for privacy, autonomy, and financial restitution during the healing process is salient among a large proportion of rape survivors, and while incarceration of the perpetrator is a goal of some rape survivors, a more common goal is merely exposure of the offender as an offender.
21
While much of this article may also be applicable to stranger rape survivors or other gender violence victims, the focus of my discussion is on the particular needs of acquaintance rape survivors.
22
The most common form of rape does not involve a violent assault by a stranger, a knife, beating, or a threat of death. Acquaintance rape victims are particularly discouraged from bringing legal claims and particularly disadvantaged when they do bring claims. "Due to a lack of physical injury, the victim's drunkenness, and the close social relationship between assailants and victims most victims are unlikely to report the assault, those that do report are less likely to be believed." 26 Rape survivors keenly desire privacy and autonomy during both the healing and the legal process. A frequently cited reason rape survivors do not report their rape is because of their desire for privacy. 27 When survivors do report their rapes, they face an onslaught to their privacy from their immediate community, police investigators, media outlets, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
28
Many rape survivors do not want others to know about the rape.
29
Rape survivors' fear of invasion of privacy is well-founded: "[i]nformation that would be considered personal and private for anyone other than a crime survivor is often included in news reports about trials. As a result, communities often stigmatize and ostracize survivors."
30
A survivor's desire for privacy also often stems from a fear that the perpetrator will harm her or re-victimize her if she reports.
31
As such, a survivor's desire for privacy and control over the dissemination of information about her rape and her background is a significant obstacle to her pursuit of legal remedies. Autonomy is one of the greatest needs of survivors during the healing pro- 24 Id. 25 Reardon, supra note 22, at 397 ("Eighty percent of assailants describe using alcohol and drugs as a tool to overcome their victims."). While the vast majority of acquaintance rapists are male, victims are both male and female. Throughout the article I often use female pronouns when referring to survivors because the majority are female. That said, men account for about ten percent of rape victims and my intent is not to gender the term "survivor." Rape Statistics, RAPE TRAUMA SERVICES, available at http://www. rapetraumaservices.org/rape-sexual-assault.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012 The majority of crime survivors suffer direct economic losses and these losses can be particularly acute where the survivor lacks insurance.
34
Indirect financial losses include "pain and suffering, emotional distress, and other hardships." 35 Because pain and suffering costs are particularly pronounced for rape survivors, the total cost of crime to the average rape survivor has been estimated to be more than three times the cost to the average robbery or assault survivor.
36
As such, rape survivors are particularly in need of financial restitution.
The goals of society and rape survivors often conflict with respect to punishment. Feminists are generally in agreement that a core goal of criminal justice reform for rape survivors should be increased incarceration of perpetrators.
37
For many rape survivors, incarceration of their perpetrators is not a key goal.
38
Rape survivors generally cite exposure of the offender as an offender as more important than incarceration.
39
According to interviews with survivors of domestic and sexual violence, it is often more important to a survivor to "deprive a perpetrator of undeserved honor and status than to deprive them of either liberty or fortune." 40 Many survivors desire not only acknowledgement from the offender, but also validation from bystanders. 41 Thus, "[s]urvivor-led justice" will not always be "synonymous with increasingly punitive attitudes or a predominant focus on convictions and imprisonment."
42
Public shaming rather than incarceration would better suit the wishes of many rape survivors. 32 Scholarship describing the inadequacies of the criminal justice system to prosecute rape cases is voluminous, so here I will only briefly summarize the salient points, with a focus on the particular inadequacies for acquaintance rape. The Department of Justice estimates that one million women are raped in the United States each year, 43 but only 2 to 4 percent of rapists are convicted. 44 Eighty percent of all rapes are acquaintance rapes. 45 There is a scholarly consensus that the criminal justice system is "reasonably capable" of handling "'aggravated' rapes, defined as rapes by strangers, or men with weapons, or where the survivor suffers ulterior injuries." 46 Scholars likewise agree the criminal justice system is poorly equipped to handle cases involving "rapes by unarmed acquaintances (dates, lovers, neighbors, co-workers, employers, and so on) and in which the survivor suffers no additional injuries." 47 This deficit of justice is caused by deep-seated problems in the criminal justice system.
48
Present obstacles include:
49
(1) failure of acquaintance rape survivors to report their injuries to the police, (2) discriminatory use of police discretion, (3) discriminatory use of prosecutorial discretion, (4) juror discrimination, and (5) lack of corroborating evidence.
50
After considering each obstacle in turn, I argue that while the first four obstacles could be remedied through legal or social reform, lack of corroborating evidence may 43 49 A comprehensive discussion of obstacles to effective criminal justice for rape is beyond the scope or purpose of this paper. 50 The Senate Report on the passage of the Violence Against Women Act described the status of criminal justice for survivors of violence against women in stark terms: "Police may refuse to take reports; prosecutors may encourage defendants to plead to minor offenses; judges may rule against survivors on evidentiary matters; and juries too often focus on behavior of the survivors-laying blame on the survivors instead of on the attackers." S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 34 (1991 with dismissals occurring at twice the rate of murder cases.
60
District attorneys' offices, like police departments, find failure to promptly report a rape to be evidence of fabrication.
61
Jurors discriminate against rape survivors. Unlike nearly every other crime, most rape cases that proceed to trial result in acquittal.
62
For the small proportion of rape cases that proceed to jury verdict, it is not easy to ascribe an acquittal to any single factor, but jurors are influenced by societal gender and rape stereotypes, 63 as well as the press's focus on gruesome stranger rapes to the exclusion of the more common phenomenon of acquaintance rape.
64
Jurors have a tendency to focus on irrelevant details about the survivor's life such as her clothing, lifestyle, or demeanor.
65
Jurors tend to view with hostility rape survivors who drank, wore seductive clothing, or accepted a ride with the offender.
66
Because acquaintance rape cases are especially likely to lack corroborating evidence, they are uniquely disadvantaged in the criminal justice system. A lack of corroborating evidence exacerbates each of the aforementioned obstacles. Rape survivors who have no corroborating evidence are less likely to make criminal complaints, perhaps because they feel less likely to be believed. 67 Police officers are more likely to categorize a complaint as rized as unfounded is similarly startling: 50% in Virginia Beach, 40% in Milwaukee, and 25% in Oakland. Id. Vocalized skepticism from the police on the likely failure of a criminal prosecution is powerfully persuasive to convince a survivor not to proceed further with her complaint. Id. 58 Id. at 932. 59 Id. 60 Id. A seventeen-month study of two district attorney offices revealed that prosecutors are particularly likely to dismiss acquaintance rape cases, cases in which the survivor deviated from a female behavioral norm, or cases lacking corroborating evidence. Id. at 933. 61 Id. at 934. One district attorney commented that a complainant who had actually been raped would not wait four hours to report the offense. Id.
62 Hodak, supra note 52, at 1098. 63 Id. at 1096. 64 Id. at 1097; Rayburn, supra note 47, at 472 ("A jury who hears about a run-of-themill simple rape where the accuser was intoxicated is likely to shrug at the details of the complainant's story. The jurors have heard it all before, but with more shocking details, more horrifying tidbits, and, if through movie or television, with an accompanying audio/ video record."). 65 
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69
Juries are more likely to acquit in rape cases lacking corroborating evidence.
70
The persistent lack of corroborating evidence coupled with a high burden of proof makes convictions particularly unlikely in acquaintance rape cases. Historically, a mistrust of rape complainants motivated states to create statutory requirements for independent corroborating evidence.
71
Due to arduous criminal evidence reform, sexual assault statutes typically no longer require independent corroboration, 72 but juries continue to insist on such corroboration before convicting.
73
The Model Penal Code justifies its advocacy for an independent corroboration requirement for sexual felony convictions based on the unique nature of sexual offenses. The Commentary thus raises the possibility that even absent a statutory requirement the unique 68 An audit of 2,368 Chicago complaints marked as unfounded revealed that rape complaints are especially likely to be categorized as unfounded because of lack of corroborative evidence. Id. at 930. 69 Id. at 934. One district attorney admitted she would never initiate a rape prosecution where there is no corroborative evidence other than the testimony of the survivor. Id.
70 This reluctance to convict could be attributable either to juror bias against acquaintance rape cases or merely to the high burden of proof. The Model Penal Code prohibits a conviction for a felony sexual offense without corroborating evidence. Anderson, Women Do Not Report, supra note 51, at 948 (citing Model Penal Code § 213.6 cmt. 6 (1980)). The only other crime the Model Penal Code requires corroborating evidence for is perjury, "particularly revealing of the Model Penal Code's concern that women falsely claim rape." Id. at 962-63 (citing Model Penal Code § 241.1(6) (1985)). Unsurprisingly, the "liberation hypothesis," that juror bias is more salient when the prosecution's case is weak, has been confirmed by empirical study. David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1260 (1997). For example, the weaker the prosecution's case is, the more influential racial or employment characteristics of the defendant are upon the verdict. Id. When the prosecution's case is strong, employment characteristics of the defendant have been found to have no effect on the jury's verdict. Id. Analogously, a jury is less likely to manifest its bias against rape survivors in acquittal when the prosecution has corroborating evidence. Id. Lack of corroborating evidence in rape cases thus exacerbates juror bias. 71 See generally Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 55. 72 Id. at 968 ("[T]he corroboration requirement has also been almost eradicated from formal rape law. Only three states-New York, Ohio, and Texas-continue to impose a corroboration requirement in their criminal codes for certain sexual offenses."). 73 Bryden, supra note 46, at 431 ("[I]t is the typical jury, not the law, that insists on corroboration."). Reformers believed that if the requirement of independent corroboration was removed, jurors would be less hesitant to convict, but there has been little change for the "reporting, processing, and conviction rates in rape cases." Id. at 320. 74 Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 55, at 960-64. 75 Model Penal Code § 213.6 cmt. 6 (1980).
234
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 36 nature of acquaintance rape makes corroborating evidence vital to extinguishing reasonable doubt. Michelle Anderson, a prolific scholar analyzing the inadequacies of the criminal justice system to address acquaintance rape, assumes that jurors' demand for independent corroboration is wholly attributable to bias against rape complainants.
76
Anderson, like most feminist scholars, does not acknowledge that the particularly private nature of acquaintance rape may much more frequently than other crimes leave jurors with lingering doubts.
77
Feminist scholars are correct to criticize statutory corroboration requirements as demonstrative of prejudice against rape survivors. But the harder question is whether the particularities of the crime of acquaintance rape would lead even genuinely unbiased jurors to frequently require corroboration before finding guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. While this is a worthy question for further empirical study and analysis, jurors presently demand more corroboration than the State can provide in acquaintance rape cases. Thus, the lack of corroborating evidence may well prove an intractable obstacle to criminal justice for acquaintance rape victims.
The criminal justice system's notorious failure to prosecute acquaintance rapists and prosecutors' enduring inability to meet their burden of proof underscore the importance of making other legal avenues available to acquaintance rape survivors. Therefore, a truly comprehensive approach to deterring and punishing acquaintance rape and providing justice for acquaintance rape survivors should also look beyond the confines of the criminal justice system.
C. Civil Remedies as an Avenue for Rape Deterrence and Survivor Recovery
Modern policy theorists, lawyers, judges, politicians, and academics all acknowledge that the civil justice system, like the criminal justice system, is capable of serving as a vehicle for the "enforcement of public norms."
78
While not a replacement for criminal actions, civil remedies offer a crucial alternative (or complementary) avenue for rape deterrence and punishment because civil remedies provide a solution to many of the problems outlined above. Civil remedies provide advantages such as: (1) a lower burden of proof and less specific elements to prove, (2) a more even distribution of 76 A plaintiff has a lower burden of proof and needs to prove her case with less specificity than the prosecution does in a criminal case. An oft-cited advantage to civil litigation is the fact that the burden of proof for the prosecution in a criminal case is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" while the burden of proof in a civil case is proof by "a preponderance of the evidence." 80 A defendant who is acquitted or even fails to be indicted in a criminal case may be found liable in a civil case by reasonable jurors without any additional evidence. 81 Rape survivors may sue for damages under 79 In the few civil rape cases that proceed to trial, monetary judgments are not uncommon even where evidence is insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, in Weldon v. Rivera, a plaintiff succeeded in recovering damages for a claim where the defendant, Gilbert Rivera, had sexual intercourse with her despite her verbal objection and despite the fact she was so intoxicated with alcohol that she was passing in and out of consciousness. Bublick In a criminal case, however, the prosecution bears the burden of proving "insufferable details about exactly which digit touched which orifice" to establish the specific offense committed. 83 The lower evidentiary burden and decreased specificity of elements may provide survivors with a chance of success that they would not have in criminal actions.
Civil actions allow for a more even distribution of rights and procedural benefits between the parties. In civil cases defendants have fewer constitutional protections. 84 In tort, plaintiffs can discover or compel the defendant's testimony, and the jury is permitted to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's refusal to testify. 85 Conversely, in criminal prosecutions the defendant has a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and may refuse to testify, and the jury is not permitted to draw an adverse inference from his refusal.
86
In criminal actions, defendants generally have counsel, but survivors do not.
87
There is no person designated to represent the interests of the survivor in the criminal justice system. In civil actions, defendants, like plaintiffs, are not entitled to free legal counsel. 88 The unavailability of free legal representation for tort places strong financial pressure on both parties to settle before trial. 89 whether there was probable cause to believe that the roommates had raped the plaintiff. The question before the district judge was whether, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, there was a continuing need for a restraining order under the G. 
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Civil suits give survivors, rather than prosecutors, control over the cases. Because survivors assume the role of the plaintiff in tort actions, survivors have vastly greater control over civil suits than criminal prosecutions. 90 As plaintiffs, survivors may determine whether and when to dismiss or settle a suit. 91 In a criminal prosecution, police, prosecutors, and judges are all tasked with considering the "safety and welfare" of the survivor, but no party is responsible for advocating on behalf of the survivor's interests. 92 If a survivor even inadvertently discloses any exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor, the prosecutor is charged with a duty to disclose the information to the defendant. 93 Law enforcement personnel cannot prioritize survivors' interests because their duty is to represent the interest of the state. 94 Because of the particular nature of the crime of rape-a theft of the autonomy of the survivor-it is particularly important for a survivor to retain autonomy over her recovery. 95 Plaintiffs' attorneys are duty-bound to represent the interests of the plaintiff and have both "the professional freedom" and "the ethical duty" to "empower the client to make her own choices, and to facilitate whatever action (or inaction) the victim chooses." 96 In a civil suit, a survivor can bargain to drop her suit in exchange for the defendant's promise to meet her demands. This is a sharp contrast to the criminal justice system, which is so hostile to a survivor's interests that it is unethical for a prosecutor to suggest that the survivor drop criminal charges if her assailant satisfies her demands.
97
Survivors are able to recover monetary damages through civil settlements or judgments. Monetary damage awards help achieve the "practical goal of more effectively redressing the economic harms resulting from abuse."
98
Obtaining monetary damages also provides the positive psychological benefit of validating the survivor's experience and reinforcing "the idea that perpetrators must be accountable for their actions."
99
Both state and federal criminal statutes have restitution provisions that require convicted defendants to pay survivors compensation for their losses, 100 but only the 90 Bublick, supra note 53, at 73. Survivors can "shape the litigation to meet their personal objectives." Id. 91 Id. 92 See Kanter, supra note 32, at 278. The interests of survivors often conflict with the state's responsibilities, but there is no ethical justification for criminal justice professionals to prioritize the preferences of survivors. Indeed, the primary focus of a criminal prosecution is on "the criminal's debt to society," not the criminal's debt to the survivor.
Id.
93 See Kanter, supra note 32, at 279. 94 Id. Crime Survivor Compensation Boards can help make survivors financially whole without the exacting toll of litigation, but the average survivor receives only $2,000, 102 whereas the estimated cost of the rape to the survivor is near $100,000. 103 Furthermore, government provision of benefits for rape survivors does little to help deter or punish rape or provide the survivor with a sense of justice.
Some individual rape defendants have sufficient assets or income from which to pay a judgment or settlement. 104 Because the future wages of a defendant may be garnished to pay the debt, survivors may obtain sizeable settlements or judgments even from defendants who are not wealthy. 105 Even modest damages from a low-income defendant for lost wages or counseling fees validate the survivor's experience, help her pay her bills, and deter further tortious conduct by the defendant. 106 Even civil suits against truly judgment-proof defendants can help achieve important non-monetary objectives like an apology or the perpetrator's transfer to a different school, apartment complex, or job. 107 Civil rape suits may also be aimed at third party defendants. 108 In fact, as will be discussed in detail in Part II.D.4, recent appellate court opinions indicate that the vast majority of civil rape suits are against third party defendants, such as "employers, businesses, schools, nursing homes, foster parents, and other entities." 109 Plaintiffs have had marked success in obtaining sizeable settlements and judgments against third party defendants.
110
D. Survey of Available State Civil Remedies for Rape Survivors
The attorneys general of forty-one states supported VAWA's federal civil remedy and feminists were united in support of the remedy. In 1999, only 500 sexual assault survivors nationwide filed civil lawsuits against their assailants, the vast majority of which were brought in state court.
113
In the years following Morrison, researchers estimated that annual civil tort actions filed by survivors of sexual assault actually increased and numbered in the thousands, 114 but the proportion of total rape survivors who choose to file civil suits remains "alarmingly low."
115
A survey of state civil remedies reveals three primary categories of remedy: (1) civil causes of action mirrored after the VAWA federal remedy, (2) civil rights statutes encompassing gender violence, and (3) traditional tort. Under the latter two regimes, civil suits against third party defendants have become more common than suits against individual alleged assailants.
116
The following discussion notes the strengths and weaknesses of each type of remedy, and concludes that all of the remedies are underutilized. I next explore the most common form of lawsuits by rape survivors: lawsuits against third party defendants. I conclude that the insurance market and the financial incentives of the plaintiffs' bar largely explain why the large majority of civil suits by rape survivors are brought against third party defendants.
The "VAWA Model" Statutes
Despite the scale of press and support that the VAWA federal remedy garnered, after Morrison there was comparatively little advocacy to pass analogous state remedies. Only California, Illinois, New York City, and Westchester County, New York have created civil causes of action modeled after the federal VAWA remedy. 117 Arizona, Arkansas, and New York progeneral signed a letter to Congress urging the enactment of VAWA in general and the civil rights provision in particular."); Lininger, supra note 18, at 1572 ("A total of thirtysix state attorneys general and a large group of feminist organizations filed amicus briefs to save the civil remedy." 118 but to date those initiatives have failed to pass. These state and local statutes provide "nearly identical substantive relief" with "similar elements of proof" to the VAWA federal remedy. 119 Statutes modeled after the VAWA federal remedy provide advantages not typically found in traditional tort actions: (1) they award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff, and (2) they provide an extended statute of limitations.
120
All the model statutes provide for punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief.
121
Like the federal remedy, they do not authorize suits against third party defendants, but third party suits may still be pursued under traditional negligence causes of action.
122
Compared to the federal VAWA remedy, the passage of these statutes received little public attention.
123
For example, the California statute passed easily but was criticized by some in the California legal community as unnecessary. 124 Commentators note that these statutes, like the federal VAWA remedy that was used in fewer than ten reported decisions each year, are used infrequently. but an appellate court overturned it on technical grounds for incorrect service of process. 128 The state remedies modeled after the VAWA remedy are both rarely used by survivors and rarely written about in the popular press or academic scholarship.
General Civil Rights Statutes
Eleven states and the District of Columbia have civil causes of action for "gender" or "sex" bias. 129 This form of remedy is analogous to civil remedies for hate crimes. Some of the state civil rights statutes allow for a broader cause of action than the VAWA federal remedy or the VAWA model state statutes. 130 For example, under the Nebraska statute a plaintiff need not have been the survivor of a violent crime to sue: survivors of "criminal mischief," "unauthorized application of graffiti," or "criminal trespass" are also eligible to use the cause of action. 131 In 2001, in Zenobile v. McKecuen, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that under North Carolina General Statute § 99D-1, the appellant had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss against a conspirator in her sexual assault. 132 G.S. § 99D-1 provides a civil cause of action where two or more persons, motivated by gender, conspire to interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of a constitutional right, and where one or more persons engaged in the conspiracy, in order to commit any act in furtherance of the conspiracy, uses force, repeated harassment, violence, physical harm, or threats of physical harm. 133 The plaintiff alleged the defendant mixed the alcoholic drinks that rendered the plaintiff unconscious, was present when the plaintiff was stripped naked, 
Traditional Tort
The common thread between both the civil rights statutes and the "VAWA model" statutes is a commitment to characterize gender-biased violence as a civil rights issue. Catharine MacKinnon launched a successful movement in the late 1970s to transform the law to address sexual harassment as a civil rights and equality issue. 138 The enormous success of this movement inspired equality activists to seek the same transformation for gender violence. The VAWA federal remedy was important for its symbolic no less than its practical importance as the first congressional declaration that there is a federal civil right to be free from gender violence. 139 As gender violence is so often misperceived as a private interpersonal problem, defining freedom from it as a civil right is important because it underscores its true nature as a "systematic, political problem" requiring a "systematic, political solution."
140
Civil rights claims are also "intrinsically assertive" and express a plaintiff's "demand to be heard."
141
By asserting their right to be heard, equality activists countered the "customary view that survivors of domestic violence and rape should remain silent." 142 The creation of a civil rights remedy for sex discrimination also helped counter views that "domestic or sexual violence is the survivor's fault; that violence against women is a The conceptualization of gender violence as a civil rights issue is the enduring legacy of the VAWA civil remedy.
Even so, traditional tort remedies offer some advantages worth considering. When a rape survivor sues under a traditional tort remedy such as battery, she only needs to prove that the defendant intentionally touched her in a harmful or offensive manner. 144 By creating innovative civil rights or tort remedies designed to offer special advantages to survivors of gender violence, states sometimes increase the specificity of the elements the plaintiff must prove, increasing her difficulty in meeting the burden of proof. 145 For example, a New Jersey statute that creates a specific civil action for sexual abuse imports the criminal law problem of excessive specificity. 146 The statute defines "sexual abuse" as an act of "sexual penetration" or "sexual contact." 147 To prove "sexual contact" the plaintiff must prove the defendant intentionally touched the survivor's intimate parts "for the purpose of sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor."
148
To prove "sexual penetration" the plaintiff must prove that "vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse" occurred "between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by the adult or upon the adult's instruction." 149 While New Jersey's sexual abuse statute offers the benefit of a longer statute of limitations than traditional tort actions, the specificity of the tort makes it more difficult to prevail under than a traditional tort action. By substituting general language for specific language, specialized tort and civil rights statutes for sexual assault may unintentionally import problems inherent to criminal prosecutions. 
Civil Suits Against Third Party Defendants
The majority of civil suits by rape survivors are not initiated against their assailants, but against third-party defendants. The dynamics of the insurance market explain the popu- 143 Id. at 255-56. 144 See, e.g., Harper v. Winston Cnty., 892 So. 2d 346, 353 (Ala. 2004) ("The plaintiff in an action alleging assault and battery must prove: (1) that the defendant touched the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant intended to touch the plaintiff; and (3) that the touching was conducted in a harmful or offensive manner.") (internal citations omitted). 145 Insurance companies do, however, aggressively market negligence insurance to landlords, employers, schools and other institutions. 154 Courts have consistently held for sexual assault claimants in coverage disputes over the negligent liability of these institutions for sexual assault. 155 Thus, suits against third party institutional defendants provide a larger and more certain reward than suits against individual defendants.
Civil suits against third party defendants also spur defendants to take precautionary measures to prevent future rapes and sexual assaults.
156
Through third party civil lawsuits rape survivors have succeeded in motivating apartment owners to improve security measures and motivating employers to perform more thorough background checks.
157
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, the plaintiff was successful in obtaining damages against an Alaskan Borough for negligently hiring, at a Borough-run home, an employee with a criminal history of sexual misconduct to care for developmentally disabled patients.
158
In Saine v. Comcast Cablevision of Arkansas, Inc., the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Comcast's motion for summary judgment as to negligent supervision and retention where the defendant cable company retained an employee after receiving a complaint that he raped a customer during a previous home visit. 159 The financial incentives of the plaintiffs' bar largely explain why third party civil suits have eclipsed suits against individual defendants. The availability of negligence insurance unsurprisingly makes third party civil suits attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys.
160
I hypothesize survivors have less trouble obtaining counsel in third party suits because deep-pocketed institutional defendants offer plaintiffs' attorneys a greater financial incentive to pursue a lawsuit.
161
A comprehensive state civil remedy for rape survivors should include third party negligence actions, but such third party lawsuits alone are insufficient to meet the civil justice needs of all rape survivors. Survivors who are raped because of institutional negligence will have access to counsel, but those who were raped in a more private interaction will not. At present, only a small percentage of tort cases filed by rape survivors fill a 153 See id. at 1573. 154 160 Lininger, supra note 18, at 1573. 161 See id. ("Third-party defendants often have substantial resources, allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for their injuries even when the alleged rapists themselves are 'judgment-proof.'").
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direct "criminal-law-substitute" role by seeking to hold individual perpetrators accountable.
162
Civil suits against third party defendants are not uncommon, but suits against individual defendants are extremely rare. We can do better than allowing the structure of the insurance market to dictate which rape survivors have access to civil justice and which do not. Many survivors desire to hold their assailants accountable. 163 Thus, third party civil suits by rape survivors should be seen as complementary to rather than as a substitute for suits against perpetrators. Rape survivors should also be financially enabled to sue individual assailants.
II. COMPARING MODELS OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION OF CIVIL SEXUAL ASSAULT CLAIMS
The survey of available remedies for acquaintance rape survivors reveals that all available civil remedies are vastly under-used by victims. The financial expense of litigation is a significant obstacle to the pursuit of civil remedies by rape victims. 164 Civil lawsuits are frequently cost prohibitive where the victim has to bear the full cost of litigation, 165 and because lawyers are unlikely to represent victims on a contingency fee basis unless there is a significant likelihood of recovery, rape victims have a particularly difficult time securing contingency fee representation. 166 Moreover, because restrictions on federal funds prohibit legal aid programs from litigating most tort cases, legal aid programs offer virtually no legal representation to sexual assault victims. 167 This section explores state governments' available modes of subsidizing civil suits: private attorney general provisions, civil Gideon provisions, and government agency enforcement actions. None of the available modes of government subsidization are ideal for encouraging civil claims by acquaintance rape survivors. Thus, I propose creating a survivor recovery subsidy fund to help fund civil suits by acquaintance rape survivors. After explaining the mechanics of my proposal, I conclude that the fund would be desirable both to acquaintance rape survivors and to the plaintiffs' bar. Finally, I address constitutional, practical, and feminist objections to my proposal. 162 Bublick, supra note 53, at 63. 163 See supra Part II.A. 164 See Bublick, supra note 53, at 77. 165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Id. 
A. Private Attorney General Provisions
Theory
The private attorney general model was developed for the purpose of spurring citizens to pursue civil suits beneficial to society at large. 168 The term "private attorney general" was first used over sixty years ago to denote a person using civil litigation to "vindicate public interests" unrelated to any injury he specifically received. 169 The concept, however, evolved much earlier. Fourteenth-century England developed qui tam statutes allowing private persons to sue for violations of civil statutes even if they had not been harmed by the violation.
170
Qui tam actions provided a percentage of the damages or civil penalties to the plaintiff as a reward for his troubles.
171
The longstanding legal tradition of statutory awards for private enforcement of public interests lends legitimacy to its modern day formulations.
Private citizens are currently authorized by statute to vindicate a multitude of public interests: antitrust provisions, environmental protections, civil rights, securities fraud, and consumer protections.
172
More than 150 federal and state civil statutes currently provide statutory fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
173
Modern policymakers have provided incentives for private attorneys general in these widespread contexts because of the distinct advantages of private enforcement. A frequently cited advantage of private enforcement is cost efficiency: "giving private parties a financial interest in enforcing public law is an efficient way to promote the public interest." 174 Fee-shifting provisions allow the cost of enforcing civil statutes to be borne by defendants (through judgment or settlement) or, of course, unsuccessful plaintiffs. In either case the financial burden of enforcement is lessened for taxpayers. 175 Conservatives have "championed the role of the private attorney gen- 168 For example, the private attorney general provision in the anti-pornography statute MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed was a response to "the perception that governments tend to under-enforce legal protections for women." 179 Absent provisions for private attorneys general, enforcement of a civil right may be "wholly dependent on the current attitudes of public enforcers."
180
Private attorney general provisions thus act as insurance for the legislature to cover the risk the executive branch will value "certain legislative goals less than does the legislature that enacted them." 178 See Morrison, supra note 168, at 609. Those without political capital are also particularly unlikely to have the financial capital to fund lawsuits, but private attorney general provisions incentivize the plaintiffs' bar to take cases on a contingency fee basis. See id. 179 Id. at 610. 180 Id. at 609 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 227 (1983)). A corresponding advantage is the ability of private attorney general provisions to circumvent the negative effects of agency "capture." Morrison, supra note 168, at 609. Capture describes undue influence on agencies of the entities they regulate. Id. By giving private citizens a right of enforcement, legislatures lessen the under-enforcement effect of capture. Id. Agency capture would, of course, be less of a concern where the entities regulated are individual rapists rather than large institutional actors. 181 Id. The Buckhannon Court cited concerns over satellite litigation about fees and the possibility that the catalyst theory deterred defendants from altering their conduct. 186 The dissent's concerns that making fee recovery less certain would "impede access to court," and "shrink the incentive Congress created for the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general" have been confirmed. 187 Empirical research suggests that Buckhannon has harmed organizations engaging in private attorney general actions related to impact litigation, civil rights, class actions, and litigation against government actors by discouraging settlement and preventing plaintiffs from obtaining counsel in enforcement actions. 188 
Sexual Assault Survivors as Private Attorneys General
Private civil rights lawsuits have become a quintessential example of private attorney general actions. Civil rights litigation protects against forms of class-based discrimination the legislature has forbidden and is therefore not only in the interest of the plaintiff, but also society at large. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was one of the first highly effective legislative attempts to combat discrimination against minorities in public and private settings. 189 Congress mandated that government agencies enforce some of the Act's provisions, but the Act also allowed private plaintiffs to initiate civil rights claims.
190
Courts equitably granted prevailing plaintiffs suing under the Act attorney fees until, in 1975 in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Supreme Court held that, while the courts could enforce statutory fee-shifting provisions, they could not create equitable exceptions to the American rule by awarding attorney fees absent specific statutory authorization except in a few well-recognized areas. 192 "Congress saw the need . . . based in part on evidence that the vast majority of civil rights survivors could not afford representation, and that private attorneys were refusing to take civil rights cases because of the limited potential for compensation." 193 Civil rights litigation is "expensive, time consuming, and technical," often requiring plaintiffs and their lawyers to acquire and fund expert testimony. 194 Civil rights claims are less likely than other types of torts to provide plaintiffs' attorneys with an adequate financial incentive absent fee-shifting provisions. 195 Civil rights plaintiffs sometimes seek nonmonetary damages such as injunctive relief, and low or middle-income plaintiffs often seek monetary damages that are significant to them but insufficient to attract an attorney. 196 The fee-shifting provisions enhance private enforcement at little cost to taxpayers because defendants, not the government, pay attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Private enforcement of civil rights also creates a more robust regulatory regime because the power to police civil rights violations is placed directly in the hands of the survivors. 197 The Reconstruction Acts passed after the Civil War guaranteed blacks the same rights as whites but remained unenforced. The fee-shifting provisions of the Civil Rights Act mitigated against under-enforcement by granting the power and means to enforce the statute to the people with the most to gain from it: those suffering from discrimination. 198 Fee-shifting provisions also insulate civil rights enforcement from shifting political preferences. 199 Without private attorney general provisions, the enforcement of civil rights would largely be left to executive branch agencies. Empirical research has demonstrated that under both Republican and Democratic administrations, private attorneys general are more rigorous than government agencies at enforcing civil rights statutes. 200 Gender violence was conceptualized as a civil rights violation on the national stage in VAWA. preferred to characterize it as a tort law, family law, or criminal regulation. 202 The Morrison Court characterized the VAWA civil action as more analogous to a criminal law than to a civil rights remedy. 203 Sexual assault survivors should be conceptualized as potential private attorneys general and financially enabled to file lawsuits because: (1) the lawsuits would be in the public interest, and (2) whether through bias or ineptitude, the government has historically under-enforced the right to be free from sexual assault. Sexual assault is technically a criminal offense in every state, and yet by and large the men who commit rape do so with impunity. Fee-shifting provisions are tools to vindicate public interests in arenas where those interests would otherwise remain under-enforced. Whether the public's interest in deterring sexual assault is characterized as primarily "criminal" or "civil rights" related, survivors should be given a financial incentive to sue because sexual assault deterrence is in the public interest no less than employment discrimination or securities fraud deterrence. Second, in light of persistent discrimination by state governments against sexual violence survivors, 204 it is imperative that survivors be granted the power to enforce their own civil rights. In the face of overwhelming evidence of state government discrimination against gender violence complaints, Congress was persuaded to include fee-shifting provisions for prevailing plaintiffs in the VAWA civil remedy. 205 Catharine MacKinnon described the VAWA remedy as putting "the power to dispute male sovereignty in women's hands." 206 State police and prosecutors are notoriously ineffectual at prosecuting acquaintance rape. If fee-shifting provisions could financially enable sexual assault survivors to sue, state legislatures could give women back the power to protect their own rights that the Morrison Court took away from them.
Despite the theoretical importance of conceptualizing plaintiffs in sexual violence suits as private attorneys general, the practical advantages have thus far been negligible. In theory VAWA's civil rights remedy empowers women, but in practice the statute has been used more frequently in law review articles than in court cases. 207 Far from creating a large-scale disruption of male sovereignty, VAWA has been mentioned in fewer than ten reported decisions each year. 208 This phenomenon has repeated itself in the two states and two cities that have enacted statutes modeled after the VAWA civil 2013] Twelve Years Post Morrison 251 rights remedy and in the eleven states that have general civil rights statutes which encompass a right to be free from gender violence. Each of these statutes contains a fee-shifting provision, but by many accounts the statutes are underutilized by survivors of gender violence.
209
The effects of Buckhannon aside, fee-shifting provisions have on an annual basis successfully enabled a multitude of traditional civil rights claims, 210 but only a handful of claims from gender violence survivors. Traditionally, civil rights lawsuits are directed at institutional defendants such as companies, schools, or government entities.
211
Like the federal VAWA civil rights remedy, the state gender violence remedies modeled after VAWA are restricted to suits against the perpetrator of the assault. Without providing the hope of monetary damages on the scale an institutional or wealthy defendant can pay, fee-shifting provisions have proven to be an insufficient carrot for the plaintiffs' bar in the new and uncertain territory of gender violence civil rights. Civil claims currently pursued by sexual violence survivors are directed more frequently at institutional defendants that are claimed to be negligently liable for the assault than against individual defendants.
212
While actions against institutions are important, they do not deter or punish individuals for committing sexual assault, nor do they aid survivors who were assaulted by no fault of an institution. Because individual defendants cannot pay damages on the same scale as an institution, a better financial incentive is needed to incentivize the plaintiffs' bar to pursue claims against individuals. In Part III, I propose an enhanced financial incentive for private attorney general sexual assault claims against individual defendants.
B. Civil Gideon Provisions
The goal of the civil Gideon movement is to increase access to legal counsel for indigent persons in civil matters. Just as the Supreme Court recognized a right to criminal counsel for indigent persons in Gideon v. Wainwright, 213 some argue the Court should recognize a corresponding right to counsel in civil cases or at least in high stakes civil actions.
214
The movement's achievements have thus far been primarily legislative, as courts have declined to find such a right. The American Bar Association ("ABA") filed an amicus brief in Lassiter imploring the court to recognize a right to counsel. 217 In 2006, the ABA's house of delegates unanimously approved of a resolution urging "federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in . . . adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, 218 such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as determined by each jurisdiction." 219 Hundreds of state laws now guarantee indigent persons a right to counsel in a diversity of contexts, including involuntary civil commitment cases, parental rights termination proceedings, child support proceedings, paternity cases, custody proceedings, and divorces. 220 New York recognizes a right to counsel for both the petitioner and respondent in protective order proceedings, 221 but no state recognizes a right to civil counsel for a person suing for monetary damages as a result of domestic violence or sexual assault. 222 While the largest obstacle facing legislative efforts to pass civil Gideon provisions may be financial, 223 recent studies have surprisingly shown that civil Gideon provisions actually generate a positive economic impact for state economies far over and above the amount invested in the program. A 2009 Texas study demonstrated that for every direct dollar Texas spends on indigent civil legal services, "the overall annual gains to the economy are A 2007 report on the effects of Pennsylvania's Access to Justice Act, which increased surcharges on court filing fees to fund legal aid organizations, found that the Access to Justice funds resulted in a positive economic impact of $154 million over five years, over four times the amount of funds invested. 225 A Virginia study of the effectiveness of its legal aid programs found "a return of $2.62 for every dollar of local, state, and federal funds invested." 226 Provision of legal services to indigent persons has economic benefits for states because such services improve clients' health, bring federal funding into a state, and reduce the need for safety-net programs, the number of re-arrests of juvenile offenders, the time children spend in foster care, and the incidence of domestic violence; 227 such services also prevent homelessness and create efficiency in the court system. 228 The positive economic effect of legal services has had an influence on state legislative debates about the right to counsel. 229 The positive impact of providing indigent survivors of sexual assault with a right to counsel is less certain than the impact of providing traditional legal services because it has not yet been attempted. The provision of counsel to indigent sexual assault survivors would ideally allow indigent survivors to recover monetary damages, thereby reducing survivor reliance on government funding for survivor health services, crime survivor compensation board funds, and social safety net services. Also, if a critical mass of suits by sexual assault survivors culminated in a deterrent effect, the decreased incidence of sexual assault would reduce government expenditures for sexual assault survivors and for sexual assault criminal investigations.
230
Despite these advantages, two flaws prevent civil Gideon provisions from being an ideal tool to incentivize sexual assault lawsuits. First, civil Gideon provisions provide government appointed attorneys who are often underpaid and overworked, and thus provide low quality representation. must maintain very high caseloads in order to make ends meet. 233 Civil Gideon provisions would not allow survivors to shop for quality counsel with whom they could establish a comfortable working relationship based on mutual trust. 234 In Strickland v. Washington, 235 the Supreme Court set a low bar for the minimum standard of performance government appointed attorneys in criminal matters must meet. 236 Under the Strickland standard, counsel must only offer "reasonably effective assistance." 237 The Court held the "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness of counsel must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 238 Thus far, counsel appointed under civil Gideon provisions have been evaluated under essentially the same metric Strickland created for government appointed attorneys in criminal matters. 239 The second problem with civil Gideon provisions is that survivors would have to meet a strict standard of indigence to be eligible for counsel. 240 This requirement means that at best, civil Gideon provisions would offer a patchwork solution: middle-income survivors would remain unable or unwilling to bear the heavy financial burden of retaining counsel.
C. Government Agency Enforcement Actions
Government agency enforcement actions are an undesirable means of subsidizing civil sexual assault claims because these actions are: (1) less effective than private lawsuits, (2) the most expensive form of subsidy, and (3) provide survivors with little autonomy.
Scholars criticize whether allocating resources for the enforcement of civil rights to government agencies is the most efficient means of policing civil rights violations. Despite the substantial amount of resources devoted to government agencies, a review of civil rights case law in the decades following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates that private attorneys have been responsible for the "vast majority of important civil rights cases." 241 Government enforcement agencies are responsible for bringing only a minority of the civil rights suits filed in court. 242 Between 1990 and 1996, the private bar initiated 84.3% of public accommodation discrimination suits.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) finds for defendants in an astonishing 95% of the claims it resolves and obtains only very small awards for plaintiffs when the agency finds in favor of them.
244
Eightyfive percent of complainants are unable to obtain any relief through the EEOC complaint process. 245 The burden of proof is particularly difficult to meet in private employment discrimination cases and plaintiffs are particularly likely to attempt to bring unmeritorious claims. Nonetheless, the private bar not only brings far more civil rights claims (including employment discrimination claims) than the government, but also obtains larger awards for plaintiffs than the government does, with the mean private bar civil rights damages amounting to thirty times the mean government agency damages. 246 Thus, "it appears the government substantiates an extraordinarily low percentage of filed claims, brings very few cases," "pursues small and easy cases," and recovers substantially lower awards than the private bar.
247
The reason for the lack of robust civil rights enforcement by government agencies is uncertain. Scholars historically pointed to the reluctance of Republican administrations to enforce civil rights, but empirical research now shows that the Clinton Administration performed worse than the previous Republican administration.
248
I argue that financial incentives explain the more robust enforcement of civil rights by private attorneys general. Private attorneys general are better incentivized than government attorneys to seek large financial damages because private attorneys usually keep a percentage of those damages. The private bar is also incentivized to take on as many cases as are profitable, but government attorneys have finite enforcement resources and are unlikely to financially gain from maintaining a complex or challenging docket. As such, allocating resources to the private bar is a more promising means of enforcing civil rights than allocating resources to government enforcement agencies.
Government agency enforcement would also be an undesirable mechanism for facilitating gender violence claims because: (1) government agency enforcement is expensive, and (2) agency enforcement would allow for less survivor autonomy than private enforcement. Government agency enforcement requires direct taxpayer funding. In tough economic times, while state legislatures are laying off crucial health, education, and other state employ- 244 Id. at 1429. 245 Id. 246 Id. at 1419-20. 247 Id. at 1438. 248 Id. at 1429-30 (" [T] here was the question of whether the EEOC's lack of effectiveness might be attributed to the fact that, between 1980-92, the agency was under the control of Republican administrations that were widely perceived as hostile to employment discrimination issues. Perhaps the agency would act differently under a Democratic administration and become a more effective agent for pursuing claims of employment discrimination . . . [T] he recent data indicate that the agency has not changed course; indeed, somewhat ironically, the EEOC has performed worse by most measures under the Clinton Administration than under the Bush Administration, particularly with respect to the level of its litigation activity."). [Vol. 36 ees, the establishment or expansion of a state government agency staffed by lawyers is unlikely to be politically appealing. Even if activists could summon the political will to build the agency, agencies often lack resources and are unable to pursue all the valid claims victims file with the agency.
Government agency enforcement would entail less survivor autonomy than private enforcement. Government agencies represent government interests, and therefore regard victims as witnesses who support their case as opposed to plaintiffs. The government does not directly represent the witness' interests, and instead merely takes their wishes under consideration, thus depriving the witness of empowerment. For example, when the EEOC pursues a discrimination lawsuit, the government, not the survivor, assumes the role of the plaintiff and is empowered to call witnesses and decide when to settle and for how much. 249 Under the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") complaint process, no one is assigned to represent the will of the complainant 250 -the role of the complainant in the OCR process is more akin to that of a survivor witness than that of a plaintiff. Under the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") complaint procedure, the agency will appoint an agency attorney to prosecute the case "on behalf of the Commission" rather than on behalf of the complainant.
251
In a private lawsuit, on the other hand, a plaintiff is empowered to make important decisions about the resolution and strategy of the suit, providing survivors far more autonomy in the litigation process. If the government takes over the role of plaintiff, the survivor is in substantially the same position as a survivor witness in a criminal prosecution: she has no power over the resolution of her complaint.
252
As a plaintiff in a civil action, a survivor at least has the autonomy to bargain with the defense to drop the charges in return for meeting her demands and to adopt the litigation strategy that is best suited to her interests. 252 When a sexual assault survivor makes a criminal complaint, "well-intentioned people-healthcare professionals, mental health personnel, police, judges, prosecutors, and others-all seek justice for the victim, but inevitably force the victim either to once again feel powerless or to relive the trauma." This has been described as the "second rape." Christopher C. Kendall Third, my proposal allows survivors to retain utmost strategic control of the litigation. A survivor would be allowed to settle at any point during the course of the litigation for whichever terms she found agreeable. Because a survivor is empowered to settle or drop her claim at any point in the litigation, she is not locked into a course of action like she would be if she made a criminal complaint. Once a survivor makes a criminal complaint, even if she changes her mind, the government may elect to proceed without her cooperation and subpoena her to testify at trial. In civil litigation, conversely, a survivor may elect to drop her claim at any point, and will not be compelled to testify at trial against her will. While civil litigation may invade the privacy of a survivor, she is at least empowered to drop the claim at any point she chooses.
Fourth, my proposal would help underscore the value of sexual assault claims to the general public, making sexual assault survivors more willing to bring claims. Sexual assault survivors suing for monetary damages are often depicted in the media as greedy and willing to lie to make money. 260 By placing government funding, and thus the government's imprimatur, behind the claims of sexual assault survivors, the public interest behind these claims may become more salient in popular culture. Fifth, my proposal involves low administrative costs. Rather than requiring the establishment of an entire government agency to enforce civil suits, the only administrative requirements are that (1) judges must issue orders for disbursal of funds upon receipt of a non-frivolous complaint for sexual assault, and (2) a state government employee must disburse the funds to the plaintiffs' attorneys. To decrease the judge's discretion, and even further save administrative costs, the statute could dictate the amount of a reasonable attorney retainer for a sexual assault civil claim. Alternatively, the judge could be required to make a finding as to a reasonable retainer in her order. In either case, the adminis- A Marine commenting on a recent lawsuit by eight former members of the U.S. military who alleged they were raped during their service and faced retaliation when they reported it stated, "I wish they would keep rape in a criminal court and not civil. I don't believe people's initial motives if there is money involved." Id. [Vol. 36 trative costs would be much more affordable than government agency enforcement. Furthermore, a state legislature could easily adopt my proposed model on an experimental basis, because my proposed program has minimal start-up costs and, in the event it failed to incentivize claims, little money would be lost. If the program is successful at incentivizing claims, but a state legislature finds the fund is becoming insolvent, the legislature could tweak the terms of the retainer agreement to increase the percentage of damages that must be contributed to the fund.
Even if the survivor recovery subsidy never becomes fully self-funding, both equality activists and fiscal conservatives have a strong argument for mandating government subsidization of the fund. Rape is occurring on an epidemic level at real costs to state governments. 261 Because so few rapes result in prosecution, the government currently spends disproportionately little money on punishing and deterring crimes against women vis-à-vis other violent crimes. Not only is this inequitable funding allocation discriminating against women, but the resultant pervasiveness of sexual assault is expensive for state governments. The Congressional factual findings at the VAWA hearings clearly demonstrated the exorbitant expense of gender violence, including sexual assault, for state governments.
262
Many survivors of sexual violence have difficulty maintaining employment, finishing their education, and using public transportation. 263 The survivors who are able to keep their jobs frequently suffer lost productivity and increased absenteeism. 264 State governments often foot the bill for safety net programs such as public housing, unemployment benefits, and medical expenses for survivors. 265 As such, the cost of my proposed subsidy might be outweighed by its deterrent effect on sexual assault, a crime that taxes state government resources.
Additionally, Congress should make VAWA funding eligible to fund tort claims by rape survivors. The VAWA statute provides that while VAWA grants may be used to provide some legal services to survivors of gender violence, the grants may not be used to finance tort litigation. 266 It is ironic that when Congress passed the first federal civil rights remedy for gender violence it simultaneously mandated that none of the statute's annual $1.6 billion in grants may be allocated for civil rights remedies. If Congress made 261 See supra Introduction. annually 'due to absenteeism' and loss of productivity related to violence against women. Physicians testified, for example, that at least 37% of female hospital emergency room cases are due to abuse, and Representatives learned of the Surgeon General's conclusion that 'battery is the single largest cause of injury among women.' Health care costs, by some estimates, were $5-10 billion per year."). 263 Id. 264 Id. 
Survivors' Unwillingness to Sue Their Rapists
The proportion of rape survivors who initiate civil suits against their assailants remains low even in jurisdictions that have adopted VAWA model statutes or civil rights statutes for gender violence. 275 The underuse of the civil remedies is likely reflective of: (1) a lack of access to legal counsel, (2) a lack of public awareness about the civil remedies, and (3) a societal bias against lawsuits by rape survivors. My proposal would eradicate the first impediment, but the other two problems should be addressed.
The lack of public awareness of the cause of action may be addressed through an education campaign to inform the plaintiffs' bar, legal services organizations, and the general public about the survivor recovery subsidy fund.
276
State governments could also require police departments to apprise rape survivors of their right to seek civil redress against both the perpetrator and any third party who bears some responsibility for the assault. 277 Law Professor Tom Lininger suggests that just as police officers are required to memorize Miranda warnings, they could be required to provide rape survivors with a brief description of civil remedies and a comparison of possible civil and criminal recourses. 278 Lininger hopes that just as police departments were instrumental in expanding the use of rape crisis centers by informing survivors of their services, they can also be instrumental in increasing survivor use of civil remedies.
279
As for societal bias against rape survivors' lawsuits, by creating a survivor recovery subsidy fund the government would place its imprimatur behind the plaintiffs' claims. The government's explicit endorsement of rape survivors' claims would likely decrease societal bias against the claims.
280
Likewise, if police departments encourage survivors to use civil suits, perhaps societal prejudice against civil suits by survivors would also decrease, just as Miranda warnings decreased societal bias against post-arrest silence.
281 275 See supra Introduction. 276 See Goldscheid, supra note 17, at 755 (suggesting that the lack of knowledge about state and local civil rights laws authorizing a cause of action for gender-based violence lead to their under-utilization, and that education campaigns may help raise public awareness). 277 Lininger, supra note 18, at 1636-37 (suggesting protocols for police agencies). 278 Id. 279 Id. 280 For example, Plaintiff Jamie Leigh Jones, who sued defense contractor KBR alleging gang rape on the job, "was [portrayed as] a relentless self-promoter who has sensationalized her allegations against the KBR Defendants in the media, before the courts, and before Congress." Stephanie Mencimer, Why Jamie Leigh Jones Lost Her KBR Rape Case, MOTHER JONES (Jul. 7, 2012), http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/07/kbr-couldwin-jamie-leigh-jones-rape-trial?page=1. If the government encouraged survivors to bring lawsuits through the creation of a survivor recovery subsidy fund, it is less likely that the initiation of a lawsuit would be viewed by the public as inappropriate selfpromotion. 281 Lininger, supra note 18, at 1637. Alternatively, if a survivor prefers a guilty verdict or admission more than monetary damages, she may decline settlement offers that do not include an admission.
Feminist Objections
Some feminists have explicitly argued that championing the use of civil law suits by rape survivors is socially undesirable.
288
They argue that making civil remedies available to rape survivors trivializes rape.
289
Commentators are particularly worried that if acquaintance rape survivors are successful in civil court but not in criminal court, acquaintance rape will be increasingly labeled by society as insufficiently serious to merit criminal prosecution.
290
A two-tier system where violent stranger rapes are criminally prosecuted but acquaintance rapes are only tort matters is unsatisfactory, 291 but legal reform is not a zero sum game in which any gains made in the civil arena will equate to losses in the criminal justice arena. Reform efforts can be made in concert rather than in competition. The criminal justice system should be made more hospitable to all forms of rape claims even as civil remedies are made increasingly accessible to rape survivors. Civil claims are not inharmonious with criminal prosecutions. Civil claims commonly arise as a result of other felonious crimes. The family members of murder victims and assault and battery victims regularly file civil claims against the perpe-287 FED. R. EVID. 408. 288 See, e.g., Casarino, supra note 122, at 200. 289 Id. 290 Id. ("Widespread use of civil lawsuits against rapists, however, runs the risk of creating a two-tier system presenting stranger-perpetrated, 'violent' rapes as true crimes, and 'non-violent' acquaintance rapes as mere torts. This classification reflects the lingering misunderstanding that acquaintance rapes are less serious than stranger rapes, and that somehow less guilt attaches to men who rape their friends and girlfriends than those who choose their victims off the street. Sidelining acquaintance rapes to the arena of tort law perpetuates this distinction, trivializes the attacks and utterly fails to discourage potential rapists."). 291 It is precisely this objection that makes it crucial that funding for tort actions be made equally available to both stranger rape victims and acquaintance rape victims.
